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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-
3(2)(e). 
IL STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. There was insufficient evidence in the record to support a conviction on the 
Theft of Services charge. 
1. Standard of Review: The standard of review for a sufficiency of 
evidence claim is highly deferential to a jury verdict. State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603, 605 
(Utah 1985). The appellate court reviews "the evidence and all inferences which may be 
reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict.55 State v. Shumway, 
2002 UT 124,1f 15, 63 P.3d 94 (citing State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). 
An appellate court will reverse a jury verdict for insufficient evidence only if it 
determines that "reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict.55 State v. Widdison, 
2001 UT 60, \ 74, 28 P.3d 1278 (citing State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, % 40, 994 P.2d 177). 
B. The trial court erred in refusing to give certain jury instructions requested 
by the Defendant regarding the Theft of Services charge, including that mere failure to 
pay is insufficient to support a conviction, fraudulent intent is required to be proven in 
order to support a conviction, and a person cannot be convicted of theft of services if 
there is evidence of intent to pay for the services. R. 81-97, T. 195-203. 
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1. Standard of Review: Whether a trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury 
instruction constitutes error is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. State 
v. Spillers, 2005 UT. App. 283 f 13, State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992). 
C. The trial court erred in excluding proffered testimony of Tracy Gillman as 
hearsay (despite concession from prosecutor that proffered testimony qualified as an 
exception to the hearsay rule as a present sense impression and an excited utterance under 
Utah Rules of Evidence 803(1) and (2)). T. 170-172. The trial court's exclusion of the 
proffered testimony denied and deprived the Defendant of presenting exculpatory 
evidence regarding the Interference with Arresting Officer charge. 
1. Standard of Review: The standard of review on the admissibility of hearsay 
evidence is complex, since the determination of admissibility "often contains a number of 
rulings, each of which may require a different standard of review." Norman H. Jackson, 
Utah Standards of Appellate Review, 12 Utah Bar J. 8, 38 (1999). The appellate court 
reviews the legal questions to make the determination of admissibility for correctness. 
Hansen v. Heath, 852 P.2d 977, 979 (Utah 1993), The appellate court reviews questions 
of fact for clear error. State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, f 13, 4 P.3d 778. The appellate court 
reviews the district court's ruling on admissibility of hearsay for abuse of discretion. 
Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28,t10, 94 P.3d 193. 
HI. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
76-6-409. Theft of services. 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains services which he knows are available only 
for compensation by deception, threat, force, or any other means designed to avoid the 
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due payment for them. 
(2) A person commits theft if, having control over the disposition of services of 
another, to which he loiows he is not entitled, he diverts the services to his own benefit or 
to the benefit of another who he loiows is not entitled to them. 
(3) In this section "services" includes, but is not limited to, labor, professional service, 
public utility and transportation services, restaurant, hotel, motel, tourist cabin, rooming 
house, and like accommodations, the supplying of equipment, tools, vehicles, or trailers 
for temporary use, telephone or telegraph service, steam, admission to entertainment, 
exhibitions, sporting events, or other events for which a charge is made. 
(4) Under this section "services" includes gas, electricity, water, sewer, or cable 
television services, only if the services are obtained by threat, force, or a form of 
deception not described in Section 76-6-409.3. 
(5) Under this section "services" includes telephone services only if the services are 
obtained by threat, force, or a form of deception not described in Sections 76-6-409.5 
through 76-6-409.9. 
76-8-305. Interference with arresting officer. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the exercise of 
reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeldng to effect a lawful 
arrest or detention of that person or another and interferes with the arrest or detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from performing any act 
that would impede the arrest or detention. 
76-1-501. Presumption of innocence — "Element of the offense" defined. 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until each 
element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In 
absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, 
or forbidden in the definition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of the offense but shall be 
established by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence. 
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Utah Rule of Evidence 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant 
evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of 
the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by 
other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, 
confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 803(1) and (2). Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant 
immaterial. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available 
as a witness: 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition 
made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter. 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while 
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a criminal case in which the appellant, Bradley W. Creer, was charged with 
and convicted of Theft of Services, in violation of Utah Code 76-6-409, and Interference 
with AiTesting Officer, in violation of Utah Code 76-8-305, arising out of an incident 
occurring at Utah Valley State College, in Orem, Utah, on January 28, 2005. R. 1, 12. 
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B. Relevant Facts ] 
On January 28, 2005, the Utah High School Association state drill team 
championships were being held at the McKay Events Center on the campus of Utah 
Valley State College (hereafter "UVSC"). T. 14, 41, 67, 113, 119, 131, 135-136, 167, 
180. Mr. Greer's, daughter was participating in the event. T. 136, 180. 
Mr. Creer entered the events center at the main entrance on the Northwest corner 
of the building. T. 1546, 19, 44. Mr. Creer entered the McKay Events Center at UVSC 
without a ticket. T. 19-20. He was confused, as were others, about where to obtain a 
ticket. A staff person testified there were signs indicating where to buy at ticket, other 
witnesses indicated that there were no signs and/or that it was not clear where tickets 
were to be purchased. T. 17-19, 125, 128, 137, 140, 152-153, 177-L78, 192-194. 
Upon entering the Events Center, there is a foyer that circles the enclosed arena. 
T. 94. Mr. Creer entered this area and, not seeing anyone taking tickets in the entry way, 
inside the foyer, or at the doors leading into the arena, then entered the arena on the upper 
level. T. 136, 138-139. Upon entering the arena, a staff person asked Mr. Creer if he had 
a ticket, or evidence that he purchased a ticket, and he stated that he did not. T. 19-20, 
i 
The evidence regarding the charges and convictions is marshaled from the trial testimony 
contained in the transcript, and cited as "T." followed by the page numbers in the transcript 
where the testimony is found. Only two witnesses, besides Mr. Creer, testified about and 
observed his brief entry inside the arena and all their testimony is marshaled herein.. All 
other witness testimony pertains primarily to Mr. Creer's interaction with the police/security 
officers, with the exception of Michelle Creer who created a video tape the following day 
demonstrating the lack of signs about where to pay for admission into the event (which was 
still going on). 
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140, 154. Mr. Creer told the staff person, and later a police officer, that he needed to get 
some money from his wife in order to get a ticket. T. 20, 86-87, 97, 141. He called his 
wife, who was already at the event, and asked her to meet him by the ticket gate to pay 
for his ticket (he had no money with him). T. 141-143, Mr. Creer briefly walked forward 
into the arena while talking with his wife to see if he could locate where she was sitting. 
T. 22, 141-142. While Mr. Creer was on the phone with his wife, the staff person called 
security. T. 22, 36. After arranging to meet his wife to obtain money to buy a ticket, Mr. 
Creer then attempted to go back outside the facility. T. 23,132,143-144,158-159. Two 
UVSC security/police officers confronted him as he was attempting to leave the building. 
T. 96, 143-145, 158-159. Mr. Creer explained to one of the officers that he was on his 
way to obtain money from his wife to buy a ticket for admission to the event. T. 86-87, 
97. 
Prosecution witnesses testified that Mr. Creer was asked a number of times by a 
security/police officer to keep his hands out of his pockets, and for identification. T. 27, 
29, 49-50, 71, 79, 87-89. Some of the prosecution witnesses testified that Mr. Creer was 
upset and/or agitated. T. 50, 71-72, 87. Each of the prosecution witnesses testified that 
Mr. Creer resisted being taken into custody. T. 30, 53, 73, 91-92. Mr. Creer testified 
that he was asked for identification, but did not recall being asked to keep his hands out of 
his pockets. T. 145, 159-60, 164-65. None of the defense witnesses testified that Mr. 
Creer was upset or agitated, or that he resisted in any way. T. 121-122, 124, 126-127, 
132-133, 145-148, 159-160, 162-166, 169, 173-174. 
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Within a very short time of contacting Mr. Creer, the two security/police officers 
grabbed Mr. Creer and forcibly took him to the ground, causing Mr. Creer to violently hit 
his head on the floor hard enough to cut it and to produce significant bleeding, and tased 
him several times. T. 54-56, 57, 73, 79-80, 91-92, 104-05, 121-22, 126-27, 132-133, 146-
47, 160-62, 169-70, 173-74. Mr. Creer was then removed from the premises, and 
eventually charged with/cited for Theft of Services and Interference with AiTesting 
Officer. T. 147,149, R. 1-2,12. 
C. Course of Proceedings 
A jury trial was held on October 27, 2005. R. 99-102, 112. Mr. Creer 
appeals the verdicts/convictions arising out of the trial. R. 99-102, T. 205-206. 
During the trial, as a witness was testifying regarding the interference with 
arresting officer charge, the trial court interrupted the witness who was about to relate an 
excited utterance and/or a present sense impression made by a bystander. T. 170. The 
prosecutor did not object to the testimony and conceded that it qualified as a present sense 
impression. T. 170. The defense proffered that shortly after the police/security officers 
suddenly and violently took Mr. Creer to the floor, the witness beard an unidentified 
person standing next to her exclaim, "The guy did not do anything wrong. At first I saw 
them frisk his pockets. Then the next thing I knew, they were jumping on him. He didn't 
resist, talk back or anything." T. 171. Despite objection from defense counsel, the trial 
court excluded the witness' testimony as hearsay. T. 170-172. 
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At the conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the jury was excused and the 
trial court and counsel discussed jury instructions. T. 195-203. Regarding the Theft of 
Services charge, defense counsel requested an instruction based on State v. Leonard, 707 
P.2d 650,655 (Utah 1985), that a showing of fraudulent intent is required to support a 
conviction. T. 197-198. Likewise, the defense argued that the trial court should have 
instructed the jury that if the defendant in good faith received services for which he 
intended to pay, he could not be convicted of theft of services. T. 197. The trial court 
denied the jury instructions requested by the defense, and did not include the requested 
instructions in the instructions given to the jury. T. 202-203, R. 81-97. 
D. Disposition at Trial Court 
The jury returned verdicts of guilty on both counts, R. 79-80, T. 206-026, and the 
trial court sentenced Mr. Creer to a term of 180 days, suspended, fined Mr. Creer 
$1,000.00, plus a $93.92 surcharge on each count, suspended all but $175.00 on each 
count, and placed Mr. Creer on probation to be supervised by the court for 12 months. R. 
105-107. 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There was insufficient evidence to convict Mr. Creer of theft of services because 
he did not obtain or receive the service being provided, and because he did not seek to 
avoid payment for any service. In fact, he had arranged to obtain the money to gain 
admission into the event. 
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The trial court refused/failed to give instructions requested by the defense 
regarding the theft of services charge. The requested instructions were that mere failure 
to pay was not sufficient to support a conviction, and that the prosecution was required to 
prove fraudulent intent. The defense presented controlling authority for the requested 
instructions, nevertheless the trial court refused/failed to give them. 
The trial court erred in excluding evidence/testimony proffered by the defense that 
qualified as present sense impressions and/or excited utterances, prejudicing and 
hampering the Defendant's/Appellant's right and ability to present evidence to refute and 
challenge prosecution witnesses, to corroborate his own testimony, and to attempt to 
prove his innocence regarding the interference with arresting officer charge. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. There was insufficient evidence to convict Mr. Creer of Theft of Sendees. 
Utah Code 76-6-409 sets forth the crime and elements of Theft of Services. It 
provides: 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains services which he knows are available 
only for compensation by deception, threat, force, or any other means designed to 
avoid the due payment for them. 
(2) A person commits theft if, having control over the disposition of services of 
another, to which he knows he is not entitled, he diverts the services to his own 
benefit or to the benefit of another who he knows is not entitled to them. 
(3) In this section "services" includes, but is not limited to, labor, professional 
service, public utility and transportation services, restaurant, hotel, motel, tourist 
cabin, rooming house, and like accommodations, the supplying of equipment, 
tools, vehicles, or trailers for temporary use, telephone or telegraph service, steam, 
admission to entertainment, exhibitions, sporting events, or other events for which 
a charge is made. 
(4) Under this section "services" includes gas, electricity, water, sewer, or cable 
television sendees, only if the services are obtained by threat, force, or a form of 
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deception not described in Section 76-6-409.3. 
(5) Under this section "services" includes telephone services only if the services 
are obtained by threat, force, or a form of deception not described in Sections 76-
6-409.5 through 76-6-409.9. 
Under the facts and evidence in this case, Mr. Creer did not commit the crime of Theft of 
Services. 
The first issue is whether Mr. Creer obtained services. As defined in the statute, 
the "services" in this case would be "admission to entertainment, exhibitions, sporting 
events, or other events for which a charge is made." U.C.A. 76-6-409(3). It is undisputed 
that the event taking place on Januaiy 28, 2005, at the McKay Events Center on the 
campus of Utah Valley State College, was the Utah High School Association state drill 
team championships. T. 14, 41, 67, 113, 119, 131, 135-136, 167, 180. It is likewise 
undisputed that Mr. Creer never entered the arena to watch the competition, and never 
actually saw or watched the competition. He entered very briefly, while talking with his 
wife, to see if he could see her and arrange to obtain the money to pay for a ticket. T. 
141-143. Because Mr. Creer never obtained services, he cannot be convicted of the 
crime of Theft of Services, and his conviction for that offense must be reversed. 
The second issue, asssuming arguendo that Mr. Greer's brief entry into the arena 
to see if he could see his wife somehow constituted receipt of some "service," is whether 
Mr. Creer did so "by deception, threat, force, or any other means designed to avoid the 
due payment for them." U.C.A. 76-6-409(1) (emphasis added). Mr. Creer did not try to 
avoid payment for entry into the arena by deception, threat, force or any other means. He 
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had every intent of paying to enter the arena, had the ability to pay, and made 
arrangements to do so. T. 20-22, 86, 97, 141-143, 151. 
The Utah Supreme Court has established that "[the] statute requires the 
prosecution prove fraudulent intent by more than just a mere failure to pay.55 State v. 
Leonard, 707 P.2d 650, 655 (Utah 1985).2 The Court explained that fraudulent intent is 
the essence of the crime of theft of services, because without proof of criminal intent the 
law would require imprisomnent "for mere failure to pay a debt.55 Id., at 654. The Court 
further explained that a person camiot be convicted of theft of services when he or she 
plans to pay later for the services. Id. 
Here, it cannot be disputed that Mr. Creer had no intent, and made no effort, to 
avoid paying for admission to the event, and that he had made arrangements with his wife 
to obtain the money to do so. 
The trial court refused/failed to instruct the jury, as requested by the defense, 
according to the controlling authority set forth in Leonard. Had the jury been properly 
instructed that evidence of mere failure to pay is insufficient to support a conviction, that 
the prosecution was required to prove fraudulent intent, and that a person cannot be 
convicted of theft of services if he or she planned to pay later for the services, Mr. Creer 
submits that the jury, based on the evidence presented, could not have reasonably 
convicted him of theft of services. State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, % 74, 28 P.3d 1278. 
2
 The wording of the statute at issue in Leonard, U.C.A. 76-6-409(1), reads exactly as the 
current version. Cf., Leonard, at 654, and U.C.A. 76-6-409(1) as amended. 
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Again, because Mr. Creer obtained no services, and there is no evidence that he 
intended or attempted to avoid paying for admission to the event, his conviction for theft 
of sendees must be reversed. 
B. The trial court erred in failing/refusing to instruct the jury regarding the 
requisite intent required to support a conviction for Theft of Services. 
Mr. Creer requested the trial court to instruct the jury that the prosecution was 
required to prove more than mere failure to pay, and to prove fraudulent intent, and that a 
person could not be convicted of theft of services if he or she planned to pay later for the 
services. T. 196-198. The defense pointed out that the Utah Supreme Court ruled, in the 
Leonard case, that a jury should be so instructed. T. 197. 
The prosecutor objected to the proposed instruction, arguing the last amendment to 
the statute was in 1994, and he did not know how the statute read in 1985. T. 201-202. 
The trial court agreed, stating: 
And I just think that is relevant, dealing with what we have here. So those 
two instructions would read[,j "The prosecution is required to show more 
than mere failure to pay. Additional evidence is needed to show a 
fraudulent intent." 
The problem with that I think is that it is directing a jury that they first have 
to show fraudulent intent, and then what percent and more. Well, they have 
to look for failure to pay, and then show fraudulent intent, which I don't 
think the statute requires anymore. 
T. 202. The trial court did not allow the requested instructions. R. 81-97. 
The prosecutor and the trial court were wrong in assuming that the language of the 
statute (76-6-409(1)) had changed between the Leonard decision in 1985 and the latest 
amendment in 1994, or the current version of the statute. In fact, the statute reads exactly 
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the same, was not affected by the 1994 amendment, and the reasoning and holding in the 
Leonard case is still applicable and controlling. 
It cannot be credibly argued that had the jury been instructed that mere failure to 
pay is not enough to support a conviction, and that the prosecution was required to prove 
fraudulent intent, that their verdict on the theft of services charge would have been 
unchanged. There was substantial and uncontradicted evidence that Mr. Creer had every 
intent of paying and had made arrangements to do so. Therefore, it camiot be argued that 
the trial court's failure/refusal to give the requested instruction was harmless. 
Accordingly, Mr. Creer's conviction for theft of services should be reversed based on the 
trial court's failure or refusal to give the requested instruction — an instruction the Utah 
Supreme Court has ruled is required. See Leonard, at 655. 
C. The trial court erred in excluding, as hearsay, proffered testimony which 
qualified as an excited utterance or present sense impression, thereby denying and 
depriving the defense of providing exculpatory evidence regarding the interference with 
arresting officer charge. 
During the trial, the defense presented Tracy Gillman as a witness who observed 
some of the interaction between Mr. Creer and the UVSC security/police officers, and 
who heard an exclamation from an identified witness. T. 167-176. As she was about to 
relate what the unidentified witness exclaimed, the trial court, sua sponte, interjected, and 
the following discussion ensued: 
Court: "I think she's about to give us some hearsay here, so --" 
Defense Counsel: "Is there an objection?" 
Court: "Well, it would be hearsay." 
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Prosecutor: "Well, actually I think it would be a present sense in questioning as 
well." 
Court: "Well, it's somebody we don't even know. I mean, it's one thing to 
do an excited utterance (inaudible) present sense (inaudible) to interview a witness to an 
accident, but it's a - but there is a lady there — that nobody even knows. No, Fm not 
going to allow it." 
Defense Counsel: "Could I just make a record, then, please of what - is there 
any way I can take this outside the presence of the jury. This is really important, and I'd 
like to make a detailed record." 
The jury is excused. 
Defense Counsel: "When a witness describes a state - this is the Rule - Utah 
Rule of Evidence 801 -- 803(1), 'Another person's statement describing or explaining an 
event or a condition named (sic - (should be "made")) while the declarant --' which is the 
person she's talking about ~" 
Court: "Right." 
Defense Counsel: —'"was perceiving the event or condition or immediately 
thereafter.' It is not hearsay. She will testify that standing there, a person in the crowd 
next to her, who obviously she's not going to know her name, said, 'The guy did not do 
anything wrong. At first I saw them frisk his pockets. Then the next thing I knew, they 
were jumping on him. He didn't resist, talk back or anything/" 
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Court: "This is more than a presence (sic) sense of (inaudible) or excited 
utterance. It's a variable in what happened. So I'm not going to allow it." 
Defense Counsel: "Okay." 
Court: "You've made your proffer. If s on the record, and the Court 
excludes. It is not an excited utterance (inaudible)." 
Defense Counsel: "It's absolutely a presence (sic) sense impression. It 
absolutely is." 
Court: "Well, you've got your — you've got it on the lecord, and Fm not 
going to allow it. Okay. Please invite the jury to come back in." 
T.170-172. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 803(1) and (2) provides: 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is 
available as a witness: 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or 
condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or 
immediately thereafter. 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made 
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or 
condition. 
The proffered statements sought to be admitted through Tracy Gill man qualify as both 
present sense impressions and excited utterances. 
The proffered statements were made while the declarant was perceiving the 
interaction between the officers and Mr. Creer, thus qualifying as a present sense 
impression. The statements related a startling event and were made while the declarant 
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was under the stress of the excitement cause by the event, hence they would also be 
admissible as excited utterances. 
A three-pronged test is used to determine if a statement qualifies as an excited 
utterance: (1) a startling event or condition occurred, (2) the statement was made while 
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition, and (3) 
the statement relates to the startling event or condition. West Valley City v. Hutto, 5 P.3d 
1, 4-5 (Ut.App. 2000). 
Regarding excited utterances, this court explained: 
Rule 803(2) recognizes an exception to the usual rule against admitting 
hearsay for "statements relating to a startling event or condition made while the 
declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition," 
whether or not the declarant is available to testify at tr ial . . . . The reasoning is 
simple: the stress and excitement of the event suppress the declarant's ability to 
reflect or calculate self interest in a manner that would produce a lie. . . . Lacking 
the "wherewithal to fabricate a falsehood, 'the circumstances surrounding the 
making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that the statement is 
trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superfluous.'" 
The classic example of an excited utterance is a witness's exact recollection 
of the declarant's spontaneous "sound bite"—an uncoached blurting out—made 
while the declarant observed the exciting event or closely thereafter. 
Id., at 4 (citations omitted). The facts here meet exactly the "classic example" utilized by 
the court. The witness remembered exactly the declarant's spontaneous, uncoached 
blurting statement made while declarant observed the exciting event. 
The statements proffered to the trial court in this matter satisfy the three-prong test 
and the legal reasoning for allowing such statements set forth in the Hutto case. The trial 
court's exclusion of the proffered statements deprived Mr. Creer of refuting and 
challenging the prosecution's witnesses that he refused to comply with the officer's 
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commands or resisted in any way their efforts to detain or question him, and to 
corroborate his testimony that he did not refuse to comply with the officer's directions. 
The trial court's exclusion of these admissible statements essentially dispossessed Mr. 
Creer of the opportunity to present evidence regarding his innocence of and defense to the 
Interference with Arresting Officer charge. 
The proffered statements qualify as present sense impressions and excited 
utterances under Utah Rule of Evidence 803 (1) and (2). The trial court not only abused 
its discretion in excluding the statements, but also deprived Mr. Creer from presenting 
exculpatory evidence regarding the interference charge. Accordingly, the conviction for 
Interference with Arresting Officer must reversed and remanded to the trial court to allow 
Mr. Creer to present the improperly excluded evidence. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Defendant/Appellant, Bradley W. Creer, respectfully 
requests this Court to reverse the convictions for theft of services and interference with 
arresting officer entered on October 27, 2005 in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Orem 
Department. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ff/ day of May, 2006. 
HILL, Jp^NSWf & & H M U T Z , LC 
, m ^ 
Juesya&tferry 
D. Scott Dl 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
Bradley W. Creer 
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VIII. ADDENDUM 
Exhibit A Minutes Sentence, Judgment, Commitment 
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BRADLEY WILLIAM CREER, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051200231 MO 
Judge: JOHN C. BACKLUND 
Date: November 8, 2 0 05 
PRESENT 
C l e r k : t a s h a p 
P r o s e c u t o r : BARKER, MICHAEL G 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): QUESENBERRY, STEPHEN 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: December 25, 1961 
Audio 
Tape Number: 108 Tape Count: 10.08 
CHARGES 
1. THEFT OF SERVICES - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/27/2005 Guilty 
2. INTERFERING W/ LEGAL ARREST - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/27/2005 Guilty 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of THEFT OF SERVICES a Class B 
Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) 
The total time suspended for this charge is 180 day(s) . 
Based on the defendant's conviction of INTERFERING W/ LEGAL ARREST 
a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 
day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 180 day(s). 
Case No: 051200231 
Date: Nov 08, 2005 
SENTENCE FINE 








Total Fine: $2000.00 
Total Suspended: $1650.00 
Total Surcharge: $187.84 
Total Principal Due: $350.00 
Plus Interest 
The fine is to be paid in full by 04/15/2006. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 12 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Court Probation. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 350.00 which includes the surcharge, 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Pay fine on or before April 15, 2006. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Violate no laws 
Keep address current with the court, 
Pay fines and fees as ordered. 
Appear when requested. 
Case No: 0 5 1 2 0 0 2 3 1 
D a t e : Nov 0 8 , 2 0 0 5 
D a t e d t h i s %~ d a y o f N d\J 
i^no-
J O I W C . BAC 
D i s t r i c t Coui 
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